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Abstract
Following the post-election violence (PEV) of 2007–8, which almost 
jettisoned the country into civil war, Kenya put in place a number of 
transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth telling, as a peacebuilding 
strategy. One of the major recommendations of Kenya’s Truth, Justice, 
and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) is the creation of institutions and 
mechanisms for peacebuilding, reconciliation, and early warning with 
a view towards harmonising their activities and adopting a coordinated 
approach. This article explicates the centrality of democratic institutional 
reforms in the process of reconciliation, peacebuilding, and long-term 
stability. In tackling the notion of national reconciliation as a central pillar 
in post-conf lict recovery and peacebuilding, this paper proposes that 
reconciliation happens within strong and properly functioning institutions 
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of governance that are supportive of transitional justice mechanisms. 
Based on the transitional justice process in Kenya and building upon a view 
of reconciliation as a process, rather than an end, this paper argues that 
strengthening institutions that function within governance structures will 
go a long way towards placing Kenya on the path to reconciliation, national 
cohesion, and long term stability. 
Keywords: Kenya, transitional justice, democratisation, reconciliation, 
institutional reforms, TJRC 
1. Introduction and background 
In response to legacies of accumulated injustices coupled with the 
desire to create strong democratic nations (Buckley-Zistel and Zolkos 
2012:3; Kisiangani 2008:56), many countries in Africa continue to adopt 
transitional justice mechanisms of truth telling, institutional reforms, 
reparations and prosecutions. Nonetheless, these mechanisms have not 
significantly helped African countries transition to sustainable and 
peaceful nations. For example, the growing criticism on the use of truth 
and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) in Africa has generated questions 
about ‘the value and utility of such commissions to meet the presumed 
expectations of their beneficiaries’ (NPI-Africa 2014:5). For instance, 
Rigby (2001:126) opines that South Africa’s TRC ‘traded justice for peace 
since some perpetrators were persuaded to say the truth after being assured 
of amnesty’. Similarly, Schabas (2004:363) argues that the Sierra Leonean 
TRC ‘in the absence of strong ritual inducement … lacked deep roots in 
the local cultures of Sierra Leone, thus many people did not see the need 
to testify before the TRC’. The International Centre for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ) in its analysis of Kenya’s TJRC report maintains that ‘the difficulties 
surrounding the TJRC process and its final report ref lect the reluctance 
of the political leadership to account for the country’s dark past’ (ICTJ 
2014:10). State fragility has since been identified as an important obstacle 
to transitional justice processes anywhere (Gready and Robins 2014). 
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Over the years, Kenya has witnessed a number of internal armed conf licts 
leading to deaths, transfer of population, rape, torture, and destruction of 
property. Elite fragmentation and ethnic polarisation have been important 
factors informing conf lict in Kenya (Kanyinga et al. 2010:4). Gross abuse of 
state power has led to numerous cases of injustices and accumulated human 
rights violations since independence (TJRC 2013:iv) culminating in the PEV. 
Following the PEV, many actors agreed that Kenya needed to put a break 
to past injustices (Buckley-Zistel and Zolkos 2012:3; Kisiangani 2008:56) 
and foster healing and reconciliation to pave the way for sustainable peace. 
This marked the commencement of transitional justice as a response to the 
need for peace and demands for justice. Some of the transitional justice 
measures established include: commissions of inquiry – most importantly 
the TJCR; institutional reforms – especially constitutional, judicial, 
security sector and electoral reforms; and prosecutions – remarkably 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) process. Unfortunately, as some 
pundits argue, ‘most of these mechanisms have since come to a complete 
halt’ (Kamungi 2015).  
This paper postulates that institutional challenges have been a major 
hindrance to the success of transitional justice mechanisms in Kenya, 
hence derailing the reconciliation and peacebuilding process. This is, 
in part, a result of ‘little attention given to local politics and dynamics’ 
(Bosire and Lynch 2014:257) and failure by Kenya’s civil society to closely 
work with state-led initiatives such as the TJRC to bolster them (Bosire 
and Lynch 2014; Hansen 2012). On its own, the state may not create strong 
institutions of governance that support transitional justice process, after 
all, the state is at the centre of numerous cases of human rights violations 
(TJRC 2013). Institutional reforms should entail a ‘process of reviewing 
and restructuring public or state institutions so that they respect human 




2. Brief contextual analysis of the Kenyan situation 
After decades of repression, ‘many authoritarian oligarchic regimes in 
Africa obliged by the impulse of mass discontent and popular protests 
already begun in the last two decades to accept their own illegitimacy’ 
(Nyong’o 1992:98). Within this time, Kenya witnessed a spirited demand 
for democratic space leading to multiparty democracy and regular elections 
(Makau 2008:247; Nyong’o 1992:99). However, fundamental democratic 
transition through institutional reforms has been slow (Kanyinga et al. 
2010:4). 
Kenya has historically witnessed numerous cases of atrocities, systematic 
violence, historical injustices and widespread human rights violations, 
with some, such as the Turbi and Wagalla massacres of 1984 and 2005 
respectively, being perpetrated by the state (TJRC 2013:187, 235). Against 
this background, a strong desire for change emerged, especially following 
the PEV (Makau 2008:249). Triggered by the disputed presidential election 
results, the swiftness with which the PEV manifested in ethnic violence 
startled the world. 
Kenya was to embark on what appeared to be a strong-willed attempt to 
transform the country by addressing the past and creating structures that 
can assure future stability. The aim was to foster reconciliation, to ensure 
national cohesion and peaceful coexistence of Kenya’s different ethnic 
groups and assure non-recurrence of past painful experiences (Mue 2013). 
‘The National Accord of 2008 committed the coalition government to 
carrying out a number of activities, with the two most prominent being the 
constitutional reform and the review of the 2007 presidential elections that 
led to the establishment of transitional justice process’ (Brown 2011:6). 
Kenya witnessed a swift constitutional reform leading to the promulgation 
of a progressive constitution in 2010. However, five years on, the 
constitution, arguably, remains the only concrete achievement of the 
institutional reform agenda in Kenya to date. Nonetheless, ‘the longer-
term impact of the new constitution heavily depends on the government’s 
respect for constitutionalism and the rule of law, which in turn is subject 
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to its political will’ (Brown 2011:130). Unfortunately, this political will and 
accountability remain almost non-existent (Hansen 2012; Kanyinga and 
Long 2012; Migai 2011:14–16). 
It is argued that Kenya’s transitional justice process has been of little 
significance (NPI-Africa 2014; Hansen 2012:3) due to vacillating 
institutional reforms and other unintended side effects of democratisation 
(Branch and Cheeseman 2009). This has prompted some scholars and 
practitioners to question the country’s preparedness for the transitional 
justice measures that it has since put in place. Some practitioners like 
Njonjo Mue (2013) opine that ‘transitional justice mechanisms were put 
in place in Kenya without a genuine regime change’. Lynch (2011:183) had 
earlier held that ‘none of the past political transitions led to a genuine 
democratic regime change in Kenya’. In his evaluation, Brown (2011:2) 
too thought that ‘the transition to a new political order was only partial, 
lacking the solid break with the past that has occurred in places such as 
Bosnia and Herzegovina or Sierra Leone’. 
An emerging strand of thought in the literature on Kenya’s transitional 
justice process alludes to the notion that Kenya lost the transitional 
window in 2002 upon the exit of President Moi’s repressive KANU regime 
(Ndegwa 1997:601). However, others hold that the PEV provided Kenya 
with yet another opportunity to address past injustices, militarisation, 
violence, and abuses and recreate a new nation based on equity and the rule 
of law (Mue 2013; Kanyinga et al. 2010:7). Kenya’s civil society has equally 
been blamed for failure to work closely with state-led initiatives to ensure 
strong institutional design supportive of the transitional justice process in 
the country (Bosire and Lynch 2014).
The increased uptake of transitional justice mechanisms by many 
fragile states has led to the convergence of state fragility, institutional 
reforms, justice, security, and development agendas. In such a situation, 
institutional strengthening is an imperative undertaking in a holistic 
approach to transitional justice (Minow 1999). Yet, as Gready and Robins 
(2014) argue, institutional strengthening can become both imperative and 
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hugely challenging. Such reforms can be supported by recommendations 
of truth commissions, such as the TJRC, especially on how to tackle issues 
of corruption and political impunity. Recommendations should include 
fundamental reforms of judicial processes that seek to build the capacity 
of the justice system since accountability contributes to transforming 
institutions (Gready and Robins 2014). However, the Kenya-ICC process 
has demonstrated that prosecutions within weak institutions can be 
counter-productive since in fragile states there is a dangerous tension 
between a strong focus on human rights that targets reform of the security 
and judicial sectors and the need to ensure service delivery (NPI-Africa 
2014:15). Another tautness occurs between legitimacy and capacity, for 
instance: ‘Is it better to have tainted institutions that still basically work or 
purer institutions that essentially do not?’ (Gready and Robins 2014:345). 
This has been one of the challenges around institutional reforms in 
Kenya. The country witnessed a swift constitutional reform but due to 
lack of political will, none of the institutional reforms contemplated in 
the constitution have been fundamentally implemented (Brown 2011: 
5–6). Instead, the political elite are keen in deciding on the route with least 
threats to their political interests (Branch 2011; Musila 2009:459).  
Kenya appears to have hurriedly established transitional justice 
mechanisms, largely as a strategy to end the violence of 2007–8, and to 
assure the citizenry and the international community of the state’s 
commitment to change the course of its chequered socio-political history 
(ICTJ 2014:2; NPI-Africa 2014:2). This was done without a clear grasp 
that establishment of such mechanisms primarily involves fundamental 
changes to infrastructures of impunity responsible for the human rights 
abuses (Brown and Sriram 2012:258). The country continues to grapple 
with embedded political impunity. For instance, the same persons, 
accused of committing atrocities, continue to control state power, making 
it extremely difficult to unaffectedly tackle issues of the past and ensure 
that justice with perpetrator accountability is taken seriously. Through the 
collapsed ICC cases, Kenya has once again demonstrated to the world what 
risks are involved in prosecutions and how poor strategies of prosecution, 
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whether domestic or international, can lead to undesired outcomes (NPI-
Africa 2014:15–16). The danger is colossal where individuals, as opposed to 
institutions, are in control of state power (Murunga and Nasong’o 2007:12; 
Di Palma 1990:496).
Some theorists have elaborated on accountability as a pre-requisite to 
reconciliation since justice for past atrocities in Kenya is partly to be 
attained through holding perpetrators accountable (Brown and Sriram 
2012; Musila (2009:452). Brown and Sriram (2012:244) emphasise that the 
‘big fish cannot fry themselves’. It is an assertion affirming that only strong 
institutions that operate outside the clasp of individuals (Murunga and 
Nasong’o 2007:12; Di Palma 1990:496) can successfully bring perpetrators 
of past atrocities to account, hence, assure justice to the victims and open 
or speed up the process of healing and reconciliation (AfriCOG 2015; NPI-
Africa 2014). 
3. Reconciliation and politics 
Recently, Sarah Maddson (2015:40–57) expounded on the complexity of 
reconciliation and multiple political challenges facing societies attempting 
to transition either from violence and authoritarianism to peace and 
democracy, or from colonialism to post-colonial stability. Maddson 
(2015:40–43) conceives of reconciliation as a process that is deeply political, 
and one that prioritises the capacity to retain and develop democratic 
political contest in societies that have, in other ways, been able to resolve 
their conf licts. 
The conviction that ‘whereas the past is painful, it is possible to transform 
the relations and structures that continue to divide societies’ (Maddson 
2015:51) is one that can nurture reconciliation. The Kenyan debate on 
transitional justice and reconciliation should therefore operate within the 
prevailing political realities. Lack of political will remains a key challenge 
to democratisation and transitional justice anywhere. But as suggested by 
Murunga and Nasong’o (2007:12), this challenge can be overcome through 
a political discourse that moves politics from the hands of people and 
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places it within institutions – since reconciliation occurs within structures 
over which individuals have no control. Such structures contribute to the 
fight against impunity and assure political inclusion, which may defuse the 
prevalent conf licts of greed and grievance. In Kenya, as is the case in many 
other African countries, control of state power is linked to development 
(Herbst 2014). This causes developmental imbalances that are bedrocks of 
conf lict. Transformation of such conf licts calls for a situation where the 
persons who control the state are not, at least, the sole determinants of the 
government’s development agenda (Kanyinga et al. 2010).
Reconciliation opens up space for politics between former enemies rather 
than covering over the conf licts that threaten their political association. 
This entails accepting the risk of politics and the opportunity it presents 
rather than eliding it (Schaap 2005:4). That is the substance of democracy: 
the ability to accommodate diversity of views (Schaap 2005:22). With such 
accommodation there is a possibility for co-existence of democratic political 
expressions (Little 2014:138). This leads to the creation of space for more 
robust engagement towards attaining co-existence in Kenya. It is for this 
purpose that Maddson (2015:51) echoes that meaningful reconciliation can 
occur when ‘divided societies expand their political capacities, embrace 
conf lict without violence and find new ways of respecting old adversaries’. 
Daly and Sarkin (2011:124) had earlier held that ‘reconciliation recognizes 
that in many deeply divided societies, the capacity to disagree respectfully 
may be the most that can be expected from conf lict transformation efforts’. 
This article reiterates that if strong institutions are widespread throughout 
the structures of governance, it will assist Kenya to respond positively 
to past injustices and place the country on the right path to healing and 
reconciliation. 
The aim is to create Kenya as a society where reconciliation and conf lict 
transformation can thrive. Underlying this avowal is an understanding of 
disagreement as normal ‘but one that requires institutional interventions 
if it is to harness its democratic potential rather than devolve into violence’ 
(Maddson 2015:52). The challenge is ‘to develop ways of engagement that 
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allow for nonconformity, dissent, open debate, and orderly political change 
when necessary’ (Maddson 2015:52). 
4. Concept and praxis of transitional justice 
The UN (2010:2) defines transitional justice as the ‘full range of processes 
and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with 
a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve 
justice, and achieve reconciliation’. The notion of transition connotes a 
fundamental shift in governance: from autocracy to democracy, military 
rule to civilian rule or from accumulated injustices to democratic 
stability (UN 2010:3). In any of these alterations, the centrality of 
democracy is accentuated, meaning that transition profoundly entails a 
democratisation process. Transitional justice consists of both judicial and 
non-judicial mechanisms, including prosecutions, the search for the truth, 
reparations, institutional reform, and national consultations. Whatever 
combination is chosen must be in conformity with international legal 
standards and obligations (UN 2010:2; UNSC 2004). Duly rooted in the 
disciplines of international law, transitional justice entails accountability 
during transition. Transitional justice includes a much broader range 
of mechanisms, goals, and inquiries across a multiplicity of disciplines 
(Hansen 2010:2–4). 
The interconnectedness of the transitional justice discourse and the 
complexity of human rights violations require global action but also 
sensitivity to local needs. Transitional justice discourse and particularly 
the complexity of the process within a slow democratising process in 
Kenya should therefore be viewed within a global theorising process. Many 
countries continue to reckon with contextual issues given the sensitivity of 
transitional justice to cases in both theory and praxis. Imitation of what 
has happened elsewhere, without proper institutional design, has led to 




5. Institutional reforms – a key component of 
transitional justice 
Weak or lack of institutions is not only the cause of state failure to prevent 
human rights violations but also the reason that state power is used to 
perpetrate injustices (TJRC 2013:57–58). Strong democratic institutions 
are remedial (Gibson 2009:137) and can facilitate the movement from 
instability to stability; from human rights violations to a situation where 
such rights are universally upheld, respected and protected (Olsen et al. 
2010:997).
Latin America has gained its place as a global leader in transitional 
justice (Grombir 2012:12; Forsythe 2011:557–8) partly due to its ‘position 
at the forefront of the third wave of democratisation and its relatively 
long experience and practice in developing mechanisms to deal with 
past authoritarian state violence’ (Forsythe 2011:558). Latin America’s 
experiences demonstrate that when establishing transitional justice 
mechanisms, it is important to restructure systems of governance that have 
in the past caused human rights abuses (Brown and Sriram 2012:258). Key 
areas of consideration are: the type of conf lict termination; the path to 
democracy; the scale of human rights abuses; the time span and character 
of the former regime; the commitments of the new government; the 
democratic status; and the length of the post-conf lict period (Kisiangani 
2008:52; Nwogu 2010:286). 
Countries with strong and functioning democratic institutions generally 
excel in terms of upholding values of justice, human rights, equality and 
the rule of law (Donnelly 2007), leading to peace, stability and development 
(Bertucci and Alberti 2005). This is partly due to the promise of political 
inclusivity and institutionalisation of governance that accompanies 
democracy (Risse-Kappen 2005:21). Robust institutional reforms can help 
overcome Kenya’s prevailing political realities (Murunga and Nasong’o 
2007:17) where the political elite continue to manipulate the system 
through entrenched structures of impunity, exposing the country to high 
risks of recurrence of violence (Sihanya 2011).  
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The significance of democratisation in transitional justice is clearer when 
examining how a f ledgling democracy reckons with severe human rights 
abuses, especially those committed by earlier authoritarian regimes, 
their opponents, or combatants in internal armed conf lict (Grombir 
2012:4). Transitional justice and democracy should therefore be explored 
concomitantly. As Musila (2009:449) postulates, ‘transitional justice 
debate is inseparable from the wider political context’. 
Olsen et al. (2010:982) argue that ‘transitional justice has a positive effect 
on democracy and human rights’. The positive effect is more likely to 
occur in situations where transitional justice mechanisms are pursued in 
combination as opposed to isolated processes (Olsen et al. 2010:982). Olsen 
et al. (2010:982) suggest that ‘two combinations of mechanisms – trials and 
amnesties; and trials, amnesties and truth – achieve these goals’. Minow 
(1999) had earlier hypothesised that a combination of various mechanisms 
might satisfy the requirements for successful transitional justice process. 
Minow (1999) assessed four main theoretical frameworks. The first two 
are: maximalist (which emphasises the highest level of accountability) and 
moderate (which emphasises victim-oriented restorative justice). The others 
are: minimalist (which warns against accountability and proposes that 
amnesty provides necessary stability to nurture democracy and human 
rights regimes) and holistic approach (that involves multiple mechanisms). 
Minow (1999) maintained that single mechanisms were insufficient to cope 
with the magnitude of problems faced by new democracies and concluded 
that a combination of mechanisms was best suited in responding to the 
demands of transitional justice, and hence suggested the holistic approach 
as being more effective. Both Minow (1999) and Olsen et al. (2010) postulate 
the centrality of institutional reforms for the successful transition justice 
processes. 
Kenya’s institutional degeneration is mired with a wide range of human 
rights violations and accumulated injustices (Kagwe 2010:417; Makau 
2008). The country has always struggled against the dominance of state 
power (Murunga and Nasong’o 2007:9; Amutabi 2007:203) leading to 
historical injustices and human rights violations such as massacres, 
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assassinations and displacements among others (TJRC 2013:57). Spirited 
attempts to reform the infrastructure of the state in line with Agenda 
Four of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Act of 2008 indicated 
the need for institutional reforms (South Consulting 2009). Reforms still 
remain vital for Kenya’s slow democratic transition. According to Grombir 
(2012:3) ‘transitional justice and democratisation are so related such that 
one cannot conceive either in the absence of the other’. Many other previous 
commentators such as Teitel (2003), Elster (2004) and Nadeu (2010:7) 
have all underscored the mutual reinforcement between transitional 
justice and democratisation. Quinn (2009:37) states that ‘justice and 
democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually 
reinforcing imperatives’. This led to the inference by Grombir (2012:15) 
that ‘transitional justice measures are likely to succeed in situations where 
there is a robust democratic shift’.
Post-conf lict settings require strategic planning, careful integration, 
and sensible sequencing of activities (Branch and Cheeseman 2009:4–6), 
through strong democratic institutions anchored in the rule of law (Quinn 
2009:37). Kenya’s challenge so far, is to separate the two; the current 
administration has consistently worked against structures of accountability 
and adopted the ‘accept, forgive and move on’ (Crocker 2000:99) stance, 
arguing that revisiting old injustices can only open up old wounds and 
complicate healing and reconciliation. Quite to the contrary, the majority 
of the victims feel that there is need to hold perpetrators of serious past 
violations accountable (TJRC 2013). 
Speaking out about what happened to them and their loved ones helps to 
restore the dignity of the victims (Borello 2004:13). This is the essence 
of truth telling mainstreamed in truth commissions (Hayner 1998:598). 
However, truth seeking and truth telling need to be conducted within 
parameters that can assure careful and effective utilisation of the revealed 
truths for purposes of justice, healing and reconciliation. Otherwise, 
revealed truths can either go to waste or in worst scenarios, become 
destructive (Hazan and De Stadelhofen 2010). While the revealed truth by 
the TJRC has not been destructive, many actors agree that the country has 
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failed to effectively utilise the truths gathered by the commission (NPI-
Africa 2014:4). The question is why Kenya has failed to make good use of 
the revealed truths for purposes of national healing and reconciliation. As 
a response to this question, there is need for critical considerations on the 
nature and design of Kenya’s institutions such as the Office of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions (DPP), the Judiciary, and Parliament. This should 
provide the legal framework and necessary resources for implementation of 
the recommendations of the TJRC. 
In the practice of transitional justice, deepening of democracy through 
institutional reform is necessary at all levels (UN 2010:2). First, institutional 
reforms are prerequisite for transitional justice since reformed and strong 
institutions are amenable to transitional justice mechanisms. Secondly, 
institutional reform provides one of the four pillars of transitional justice 
(ICTJ 2012:5) since correction of past wrongs involves altering factors that 
were responsible for injustices. Weak or non-existent democratic institutions 
are important reasons for injustices and human rights violations (Gibson 
2009:137; TJRC 2013:57). The centrality of the state makes it impossible for 
it to be exonerated from human rights violations and injustices. Either way, 
the state remains culpable since it either perpetrates or is unable to prevent 
human rights violations. A case study of Mount Elgon (TJRC 2013) revealed 
that victims succinctly placed the blame on the state security apparatus for 
numerous human rights violations committed against innocent civilians 
in 2008 (TJRC 2013). Thirdly, reformed institutions are basic guarantors 
for assurance of non-recurrence. Other transitional justice mechanisms, 
such as prosecutions and reparations, are sustained within a framework 
of democratic structures and principles that are a consequence of strong 
democratic institutional design (Maddson 2015:57). 
Kenya’s perennial challenges of negative ethnicity and political impunity 
cannot be checked by individuals but can be rectified through mechanisms 
that operate within the parameters of strong and functional democratic 
institutions anchored in the rule of law (Bosire and Lynch 2014; Murunga 
and Nasong’o 2007:4–6). But institutional reforms are unlikely to reverse 
the situations where politicians, some of whom accused of committing 
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atrocities, determine the route to take. Proper and full implementation of 
the Constitution of Kenya is one of the practical strategies towards reforms. 
Yet the process has faced numerous challenges (Sihanya 2011) with a shift in 
political narrative from implementation to amendment (Mugambi 2015). 
The role of the civil society to provide corrective action is indispensable, 
since government and the political class have demonstrated unwillingness 
to lead the way (Bosire and Lynch 2014).
6. Institutional reforms for peace consolidation 
Inspiring public confidence in the redress of grievances, human rights 
violations and various forms of injustices obtainable through legitimate 
means within known structures and predictable processes is important 
in the consolidation of peace (Onyango and Maina 2015:1). Legitimate 
structures for peaceful settlement of disputes and fair administration of 
justice within strong democratic institutions of governance are amenable 
to peace consolidation (Arbetman and Kugler 1997). States with high 
institutional quality are less likely to experience civil war or conf lict due 
to their responsiveness to the needs of their citizens; whereas those with 
low quality institutions can lose the loyalty and support of their citizens, 
and consequently fall prey to violent conf licts (Taydas et al. 2010). As 
already said, peace, stability, and development are more likely in countries 
with strong democratic institutions (Bertucci and Alberti 2005), not 
only because they are inclined towards upholding justice, human rights, 
equality and the rule of law (Donnelly 2007), but also due to the high level 
of political inclusivity they exude (Risse-Kappen 2005:21). 
Kenya embarked on a vigorous reform agenda following the PEV with 
the major achievement so far being a new constitution. However, in 
implementing the constitution, the political elite are keen to decide on a 
route with the least threats to their political interests (Brown and Sriram 
2012). It is important, therefore, to put in place structures of constitutional 
implementation devoid of overreliance on the political elite (Bosire and 
Lynch 2014:257). Onyango and Maina’s (2015) assessment of institutional 
reform concludes that Kenya’s reforms, in the short term, contributed to 
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preventing a repeat of electoral violence in 2013, but nothing much has 
been done to ensure sustainable peace in the long term. 
Full implementation of the 2010 constitution remains central to the reform 
agenda. The constitution establishes rules, principles, and mechanisms 
that, if implemented, would strengthen the ability of the country to 
redress past wrongs and end impunity by ensuring accountability in the 
exercise of state power. Laws and regulations that give the statutory order 
an authoritarian character can be transformed to ensure conformity with 
the values and principles of the constitution (Kwasi 2007:70). Much of the 
power of government is exercised by the president through bureaucrats 
who regulate the daily lives of citizens and therefore exercise broad 
delegated powers. Creating mechanisms to regulate exercise of government 
power through reformed statutory orders will ensure ‘certain norms in 
accordance with which state officials, as well as, private individuals are to 
treat one another, even and precisely, under conditions of extreme hostility’ 
(Benhabib 2004:8). In this regard the ‘traditional refrain of the soldier and 
the bureaucrat that “I was only doing my duty” is no longer an acceptable 
ground for abrogating the rights of humanity in the person of the other’ 
(Benhabib 2004:8).
6.1 Judicial Reforms 
Kenya embarked on extensive judicial reforms with a rigorous process of 
appointment of the Chief Justice where applicants were publicly interviewed 
by a revamped Judicial Service Commission (JSC). Subsequently, 
parliament passed the vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act in 2011 to 
facilitate the vetting of serving judges and magistrates and terminate their 
employment where necessary (Goin 2015). However, as the current Chief 
Justice Mutunga (2011) agrees, the effectiveness of judicial reforms depends 
on wider reforms in the entire justice sector. This would include critical 
stakeholders, such as, the prosecuting authorities, penal institutions and 
the police – and even the executive and parliament which put forward 
and approve budgetary allocations (Gainer 2015). Therefore, there is need 
to ensure that complementary reforms are taking place within all those 
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other institutions in order to ensure effective and timely delivery of justice 
(Bosire 2012). 
Since 2010, institutional culture and structural impediments have stood in 
the way of judicial reforms (Gainer 2015:3), but this should not be allowed 
to retard efforts to implement an ‘ambitious plan to make the courts 
more efficient and open, increase professionalism, and expand the court 
system’ (Gainer 2015:4). The process of judicial reforms has to revamp 
an opaque system, many of whose members have historically had strong 
senses of entitlement (Mutunga 2011). These reforms, Mutunga (2011) 
suggests, should aim at overcoming internal resistance, strengthening 
weak accountability mechanisms, and finding the necessary resources.
Another key component of judicial reforms is structuring judicial 
accountability. Accountability is a particularly tough challenge because 
many Kenyans do not understand how the court system works, and lawyers 
are often involved in corruption (Final Report of the Task Force on Judicial 
Reforms 2015). ‘For reforms to take root, users of the justice system – 
whether lawyers or everyday citizens – have to understand how the courts 
should function and demand that judicial officers deliver quality services’ 
(Gainer 2015:5). This requires high and consistent levels of sensitisation. 
The Final Report of the Task Force on Judicial Reforms (2015) contains key 
fundamental recommendations in justice sector reforms. Access to justice 
has been pointed out as the first pillar and key result area. This should 
‘encompass such actions as the establishment of customer care desks to 
answer questions, the simplification of court procedures, and the creation 
of a case management system’ (Gainer 2015:6). It stretches to public 
and stakeholder engagement, including ‘the strengthening of complaint 
mechanisms and the creation of more-formal structures for court users’ 
committees’ (Gainer 2015:6). In addition, change of institutional culture, 
increased training, clarified responsibilities, an expanded court system 
and its budget, and increased use of information and communications 
technology are vital (Gainer 2015:6). This entails, in part, simplifying 
and communicating procedures, creating strong monitoring mechanisms, 
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and building structures that are responsive to complains (Gainer 2015: 
9–12). To expedite judicial reforms, the creation of known frameworks of 
sustained engagement of the civil society and the public is equally crucial 
(Gainer 2015:13; Bosire and Lynch 2014). 
6.2 Parliamentary reforms 
Increased awareness of the links of parliament to the conf lict-poverty 
nexus has in recent times led to a growing acknowledgment of the role 
of parliaments in peacebuilding. Parliament is one of the best tools for 
managing issues of conf lict and poverty that affect the nation (O’Brien 
et al. 2008). Factors that underlie conf licts in Kenya are often found 
in constitutional and electoral systems or in how those systems are 
operationalised and in the way public resources are utilised (Barkan 2004). 
Representatives of the people are better placed to address potential causes 
of conf lict before violence erupts. ‘Parliaments are perceived therefore 
as perfectly positioned to contribute to peacebuilding through conf lict 
prevention initiatives, oversight and accountability over the executive, 
public service and public resource, as well as, through programmes that 
tackle poverty and conf lict’ (O’Brien et al. 2008:21). 
Parliaments are more representative of diversity; their members are equal 
by design, and more accessible to the public than executive and judicial 
arms of government (Olson 1994). This makes parliament a unique forum 
to address contentious issues (Onyango and Maina 2015:6), such as Kenya’s 
current crisis on electoral reforms. Parliament can also be a forum that helps 
build relationships among conf lict-affected societies (O’Brien et al. 2008) – 
a forum for ethnic communities in Kenya where rivalries are commonplace. 
Parliament is recognised as fundamental not only to democracy but also to 
the relationship among different groups of people represented, as well as, 
the executive and the judiciary (Brazier 2007). Furthermore, parliament as 
a transformative dialogue forum within a divided society, if it satisfies all 
parties (Ramsbotham et al. 2011), is better positioned to address matters of 
national concern. The committee system enables the legislature to organise 
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its affairs and to shadow the operations of government agencies (Barkan 
2009:48–49.)  
A robust and independent parliament can help inspire public confidence. 
Various groups represented in parliament will trust that their representatives 
will handle competently, diligently, and independently issues of concern, 
including grievances, without resorting to violence (O’Brien et al. 2008.). 
In order for it to deliver effectively on this mandate, parliament should 
be properly constituted and its constitutional independence safeguarded 
(Onyango and Maina 2015:5). There should be mechanisms to ensure that 
interest groups seeking favourable legislative outcomes do not subvert the 
public interest (Onyango and Maina 2015; Bosire and Lynch 2014; O’Brien 
et al. 2008). Accountability mechanisms for parliamentary reforms, 
therefore, should include those that regulate lobbying, conf licts of interest, 
misconduct, and abuse of power (Onyango and Maina 2015:5–6).
6.3 Security sector reforms 
Kenya’s existing security architecture is still deficient in a number of 
respects. For instance, policing still largely remains executive-dependent, 
undemocratic, and inequitable (Saferworld 2015; Migai 2011). The ruling 
class still want to ‘have the security agencies deployed to serve the interests 
of the regime to the detriment of crime control and protecting citizens’ 
(Migai 2005:228). Secrecy surrounding security operations has made the 
security sector the most corrupt centre in government. The police are 
usually heavy-handed, insensitive, and use excessive force, leading to a 
compromised public confidence (Saferworld 2015). Security governance is 
largely not participatory, because citizens are not consulted in decision-
making (Migai 2010:32). Discretionary presidential power over security 
agencies that the constitution sought to correct still exists. In the pretext of 
fighting terrorism, the current regime has sought to regain such powers as 
witnessed in the recent controversial Security Laws Amendments Act 2015 
(Mugambi 2015).
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In addition, no mechanism ensures accountability of joint police/military 
operations, which historically have operated in a regulatory vacuum (Migai 
2010:31–33). Such operations are often characterised by gross human rights 
violations (Migai 2010:32), and investigating the military is problematic 
(TJRC 2013:72–76). For instance, the TJRC (2013:75) reports that ‘the 
commission’s interactions with the military were difficult and requests 
for information went largely unanswered’. During such operations, there 
is a great need to create clear and operational mechanisms and legal 
frameworks for ensuring military accountability through legislation, 
anchored in Article 241 of the Constitution. 
The police reform agenda must be driven to provide its desired impact, 
maintaining its goal of sustainable peace, stability and justice for all 
through the rule of law and respect for human rights (Migai 2010:33). 
It is equally important to create synergies between reforms in different 
institutions touching on the security sector since a malpractice of one 
institution inevitably impacts on the others (Onyango and Maina 
2015:1). Reforms should be implemented within the broader philosophy 
of change management that requires a conducive and supportive political 
environment, including the commitment of the executive arm of 
government (Onyango and Maina 2015:3). 
Commissions of inquiry and task forces dealing with police reforms have 
suggested that careful evaluation of police officers is a prerequisite to 
transforming the police. In particular, implementing the recommendations 
of the National Task Force on Police Reforms should form part of the process 
(Migai 2010), thus addressing challenges of police evaluation. Among 
others, the Task Force recommended that all officers be subjected to a 
review against criteria such as professionalism, integrity, track record, and 
psychological fitness. It is imperative to implement these recommendations 
to the extent that they promote the values of the constitution and ensure a 





This essay maintains that strengthening of institutions, as a strategy of 
peacebuilding, is most likely through implementation of various transitional 
justice mechanisms. Such mechanisms should aim at confronting the 
past, ending injustices, fostering reconciliation, redressing the victims, 
ending the culture of impunity and building structures that can prevent 
recurrence of past injustices. Through strong institutions afforded by the 
principles of democracy, the norms of transparency, equity, accountability 
and non-interference with judicial and non-judicial transitional justice 
processes are fortified (Nadeu 2010:8). Transitional justice measures are 
more likely to succeed if Kenya puts in place strong democratic institutions. 
These include fundamental reforms of critical sectors of governance such 
as the judiciary, parliament, the security sector, electoral process and the 
public service. 
Kenya will do well not to retreat from the trajectory of transitional justice. 
However, actors in this field must be alive to the fact that any country 
which attempts to utilise transitional justice mechanisms to tackle past 
human rights abuses during the process of democratisation faces political, 
judicial, and ethical challenges (Arenhövel 2008:576). To surmount such 
challenges, the inevitability of institutional reforms comes to bear since 
the process largely depends on the nature of government and democratic 
institutions in place (Forsythe 2011:557–8). Kenya should relentlessly 
continue in the path of reforming structures of governance through 
designing institutions responsive to current demands of peacebuilding, 
reconciliation, and national cohesion. This paper accentuates the need 
to have robust institutional reforms as the basis for transitional justice 
mechanisms to avoid replication of failure of transitional justice measures, 
not only in Kenya, but also across Africa where many countries are emerging 
from violent conf licts and others such as South Sudan and Burundi are still 
trapped in violence and political uncertainty. 
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